Evaluation of Government Policy Implementation in the Abolition of the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises for Economic Structural Reform
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Abstract
This study evaluates the implementation of a landmark Indonesian government policy: the abolition of the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and its replacement with a super holding body, BPI Danantara, under Law No. 1/2025. This structural reform aims to enhance SOE efficiency, professionalism, and competitiveness by reducing bureaucracy and political intervention. Using a qualitative policy analysis method, this research examines the policy's rationale, legal framework, economic impact, and comparative standing with Singapore's Temasek Holdings. The findings indicate that while the policy is well-rationalized and supported by recent positive financial performance, its legal framework introduces significant governance risks. Specifically, it creates legal ambiguities regarding asset status and managerial accountability, potentially weakening anti-corruption measures. Furthermore, unlike the politically independent Temasek model, Danantara's direct accountability to the President may perpetuate political intervention. The study concludes that the reform's success is contingent upon addressing these critical legal and governance challenges.
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