

The Legal Politics of the Establishment and Governance of the National Nutrition Agency

Politik Hukum Pembentukan dan Tata Kelola Badan Gizi Nasional

M. Reza Saputra¹ , Sofyan Piyo² , Yassine Chami³ 

¹Universitas Pembangunan Nasional Veteran Jakarta, Indonesia

²State University of Gorontalo, Indonesia

³Abu Dhabi University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

Article Info

Corresponding Author:

M. Reza Saputra

✉ reza.alkasyaf88@gmail.com

History:

Submitted: 10-01-2026

Revised: 20-02-2026

Accepted: 28-03-2026

Keyword:

Executive Aggrandizement; Food Security Governance; Expertise Meritocracy; Administrative Law Resilience.

Kata Kunci:

Mata Uang Digital Bank Sentral; Konstitusionalisme Digital; Kedaulatan Moneter; Anonimitas Berjenjang; Arsitektur Web3.

Abstract

The establishment of the National Nutrition Agency as a massive budget entity through Presidential Regulation triggers constitutional anomalies by disregarding legislative hierarchy and expertise meritocracy. This doctrinal legal research deconstructed executive legal politics pathology and government ethics implications using conceptual parameters, structural regulation, and comparative constitutional law. The analysis conclusively proves that founding giant institutions without constitutional delegation represents executive dominance paralyzing power limitation mechanisms, while institutional legitimacy is engineered through parliamentary budget pragmatism. Lacking meritocratic instruments that prevent medical nonexpert leadership appointments demonstrably creates epistemological dissonance, triggers jurisdictional disharmony, and fatally degrades public health safety standards. This study asserts that mass nutrition interventions fundamentally require absolute comprehensive institutional restructuring. This research offers prescriptive novelty by recommending an independent medical oversight committee under legislative frameworks to secure accountability systems, critically enriching global constitutionalism discourses regarding contemporary administrative law resilience and public health governance for universal social welfare policy formulations internationally.

Abstrak

Pembentukan Badan Gizi Nasional sebagai entitas pengelola anggaran masif melalui instrumen Peraturan Presiden memicu anomali ketatanegaraan akibat pengabaian hierarki legislasi dan meritokrasi kepakaran. Penelitian hukum doktrinal ini mendekonstruksi patologi politik hukum eksekutif serta implikasi etika pemerintahan menggunakan parameter konseptual, regulasi struktural, dan perbandingan hukum konstitusi. Hasil analisis konklusif membuktikan bahwa pendirian institusi raksasa tanpa delegasi konstitusional merepresentasikan dominasi eksekutif yang melumpuhkan mekanisme pembatasan kekuasaan, sementara legitimasi institusional terekayasa melalui pragmatisme anggaran parlemen. Ketiadaan instrumen meritokrasi yang mencegah penunjukan pimpinan nirkepakaran medis terbukti menciptakan disonansi epistemologis, memicu disharmonisasi yurisdiksi, dan fatalnya mendegradasi standar keamanan kesehatan publik. Studi ini menegaskan bahwa intervensi nutrisi massal secara fundamental membutuhkan restrukturisasi institusional absolut dan komprehensif. Riset ini menawarkan kebaruan preskriptif dengan merekomendasikan komite pengawas medis independen berpayung kerangka legislasi guna mengamankan sistem akuntabilitas, sembari kritis memperkaya diskursus konstitusionalisme global mengenai resiliensi hukum administrasi kontemporer beserta tata kelola kesehatan publik bagi formulasi kebijakan kesejahteraan sosial internasional.



Copyright: © 2026 by the authors. Submitted for possible open access publication under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY SA).

 <https://doi.org/10.65101/jm1t1d15>

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Background

The establishment of state agencies managing colossal national budgets should ideally emanate from democratic legislative deliberation to safeguard the constitutional principle of checks and balances. However, the formation of the National Nutrition Agency (*Badan Gizi Nasional* or BGN)—an entity tasked with administering an initial state budget (APBN) of IDR 71 trillion for the Free Nutritious Meal Program (*Program Makan Bergizi Gratis* or MBG)—blatantly disregards this constitutional tradition.^{1,2} This super-body agency was established unilaterally and instantaneously by executive power, relying solely on Presidential Regulation (*Peraturan Presiden*) No. 83 of 2024, devoid of any parent statutory mandate, legislative delegation, or the revocation of existing authorities from sectoral statutory frameworks.^{3,4,5} This pragmatic decision to circumvent the legislative review process triggers a severe structural anomaly: an entity vested with hegemonic authority to directly intervene in mass nutritional fulfillment rests upon a highly fragile administrative law foundation.

Global academic discourse has extensively warned against the perils of institutional fragmentation and the marginalization of technical expertise in public health governance. Through their study on the governance of the national school feeding program in Brazil, Alves Da Silva et al. (2023) asserted that the resilience of mass nutritional interventions heavily depends on decentralization and rigid statutory delegation, rather than mere executive discretion.⁶ Furthermore, Thomson (2024) demonstrated that administrative

¹ Luis Fiska Rahayu, "Dinamika Dukungan Politik Terhadap Program Makan Bergizi Gratis (MBG) Di Indonesia," *PANDITA: Interdisciplinary Journal of Public Affairs* 8, no. 2 (October 2025): 815–31, <https://doi.org/10.61332/ijpa.v8i2.381>.

² I Wayan Lendra, Daud Husni, and Yuyun Fitriani, "Kebijakan Makan Bergizi Gratis Dan Relevansinya Terhadap Nilai-Nilai Good Governance: Analisis Kualitatif Dalam Administrasi Publik," *Arus Jurnal Sosial Dan Humaniora* 5, no. 1 (April 2025): 937–45, <https://doi.org/10.57250/ajsh.v5i1.1252>.

³ Bawon Nul Hakim and Wahida Yuliana, "Implikasi Yuridis Perpres Nomor 83 Tahun 2024 Terhadap Tata Kelola Program Makan Bergizi Gratis," *Ekspose: Jurnal Penelitian Hukum Dan Pendidikan* 24, no. 2 (October 2025): 267–83, <https://doi.org/10.30863/ekspose.v24i2.10485>.

⁴ Ginanjar Masruri and Heru Nugraha, "Program Makan Bergizi Gratis Sebagai Instrumen Politik Janji Pemilu: Analisis Kebijakan Anggaran Dan Dampaknya Terhadap Kualitas Pendidikan Indonesia Dalam Menyongsong Indonesia Emas 2045," *RIGGS: Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Business* 4, no. 4 (January 2026): 12100–108, <https://doi.org/10.31004/riggs.v4i4.5441>.

⁵ Sahrul Pora, Dafrin Muksin, and Al Fauzi Rahmat, "Implementasi Program Makan Bergizi Gratis Pada Pemerintahan Prabowo-Gibran: Solusi Dan Tantangan," *Jurnal Noken: Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial* 11, no. 2 (December 2025): 635–94, <https://doi.org/10.33506/jn.v11i2.4352>.

⁶ Eliane Alves Da Silva, Eugenio Avila Pedrozo, and Tania Nunes Da Silva, "The PNAE (National School Feeding Program) Activity System and Its Mediations," *Frontiers in Environmental Science* 10 (January 6, 2023), <https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2022.981932>.

law design operates directly as a determinant of public health; the absence of a coherent statutory structure and equivalent institutional oversight inherently degrades nutritional safety standards.⁷ In the context of bureaucratic ethics, Ferede et al. (2025) and Mirayanti et al. (2025) conclusively highlighted that the erosion of the merit system—particularly the appointment of non-expert figures to leadership positions—will disrupt accountability and precipitate policy failures in public service delivery.^{8,9} The empirical realities presented in this global literature are precisely mirrored in the governance of the BGN in Indonesia. The appointment of an applied entomologist as its head—a decision that starkly conflicts with the General Principles of Good Administration (*Asas-Asas Umum Pemerintahan yang Baik* or AUPB)—rapidly generated unscientific discourse on protein substitution, weakened legal liability frameworks, and culminated in incidents of mass malnutrition and food poisoning during its initial operational phase.^{10,11,12,13,14,15}

Although previous literature has extensively dissected the vulnerabilities of nutritional programs caused by bureaucratic fragmentation, there remains a distinct *lacuna* in legal scholarship specifically deconstructing the institutionalization of state nutritional interventions via an executive shortcut amidst massive budgetary allocations. Herein lies the legal novelty of this research. This article incisively addresses this academic blind spot by confronting the *de jure* legal fragility of the BGN's unilateral executive formation *vis-à-vis* the *de facto* fictitious legitimacy acquired through

⁷ Stephen Thomson, "Administrative Law as a Determinant of Public Health," *Canadian Journal of Public Health* 115, no. 1 (February 6, 2024): 168–72, <https://doi.org/10.17269/s41997-023-00826-w>.

⁸ Worku Lemlemu Ferede, Yalew Endawoke, and Gedif Tessema, "Assessment of Meritocracy, Accountability, and Public Service Reforms in Ethiopia: Evidence from Public Organizations in the Northwest Region," *Cogent Business & Management* 12, no. 1 (December 12, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2025.2492388>.

⁹ Mirayanti Mirayanti et al., "The Illusion of Meritocracy: A Critical Analysis of Open Selection for Senior Leadership in Indonesia," *Cogent Social Sciences* 11, no. 1 (December 31, 2025), <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2025.2484472>.

¹⁰ Tatimmatunni 'Amah and Aminullah Aminullah, "Meritokrasi Dalam Bayang-Bayang Birokrasi," *Parlementer: Jurnal Studi Hukum Dan Administrasi Publik* 3, no. 1 (February 13, 2026): 01–07, <https://doi.org/10.62383/parlementer.v3i1.1496>.

¹¹ Martin Yogi Pardamean, "Sejumlah Kontroversi Pernyataan Kepala BGN," *Tempo*, 2025, <https://www.tempo.co/politik/sejumlah-kontroversi-pernyataan-kepala-bgn-1593448>.

¹² Dian Sanitri, Annisa Finda Solihah, and Elyasa Yahya Saputri, "Kewenangan Dan Tanggung Jawab Hakim Dalam Menerapkan Asas-Asas Umum Pemerintahan Yang Baik (AAUPB): Analisis Putusan Nomor 52/G/2025/PTUN.SMG," *Journal of Innovative and Creativity* 6, no. 1 SE-Articles (January 2026): 6484–89.

¹³ Mohammad Farhan and Rifqi Ridlo Phahlevy, "Government Responsibility and Liability in the Implementation of the Free Nutritious Food Program," May 2026, <https://doi.org/10.21070/ups.10365>.

¹⁴ Syifa Qolbiyah Nasir, "Potential of Edible Insects in Indonesia as Nutritious Local Food," *Journal of Food and Culinary*, July 2025, 22–37, <https://doi.org/10.12928/jfc.v8i1.13717>.

¹⁵ Iqra Ardini et al., "Strategi Komunikasi Badan Gizi Nasional Dalam Pelibatan Pemangku Kepentingan: Studi Pada Kasus Keracunan Makanan Program Makan Bergizi Gratis," *Jurnal Manajemen Pendidikan Dan Ilmu Sosial* 7, no. 2 (March 2026): 1670–82, <https://doi.org/10.38035/jmpis.v7i2.7927>.

parliamentary budgetary approval. This novelty is further fortified by a critical analysis of the merit system's pathology within Indonesian bureaucratic governance. It sharply highlights the ethical conflicts of public officials regarding the appointment of an applied entomologist to dictate the trajectory of biomedical and clinical nutrition policies. The tangible impact of this expertise dissonance has demonstrably manifested in poor initial operational hygiene and hazardous, unscientific discourses on protein substitution.

Consequently, this article is constructed upon the central thesis (*thesis statement*) that the circumvention of sectoral legislative hierarchies and the disregard for scientific meritocracy standards in establishing the National Nutrition Agency constitute far more than mere formal defects in administrative law. Rather, they represent a manifestation of executive aggrandizement that existentially reduces public health to a mere arena for political gambles. To unravel this disruption, this study deconstructs the *ratio legis* and legal politics behind the utilization of a Presidential Regulation, scrutinizes potential jurisdictional overlaps with the AUPB and existing ministerial authorities, and concludes by offering prescriptive recommendations for institutional restructuring. These proposed solutions focus on the reconstruction of the BGN toward an evidence-based policy governance model, which must be mandated by statutory-level regulations to institutionalize an independent system of checks and balances.

2. Research Questions

Predicated on the foundational context established above, this academic inquiry articulates two central legal issues for comprehensive analysis. First, it investigates how the paradigm of legal politics evaluates the establishment of the National Nutrition Agency (BGN) solely through a Presidential Regulation, particularly in light of the agency's colossal budgetary authority. Second, it examines how administrative law and governmental ethics scrutinize the governance architecture of the BGN. This secondary inquiry specifically addresses the circumvention of meritocratic standards in leadership appointments and the inherent risks of jurisdictional disharmony among existing state organs.

3. Research Methods

This study is constructed as pure doctrinal legal research, operating exclusively within a non-statistical, qualitative framework.¹⁶ The research design integrates two

¹⁶ Terry Hutchinson, "Doctrinal Research," in *Research Methods in Law* (London: Routledge, 2025), 8–38, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032710372-2>.

primary methodological approaches: a statutory approach and a conceptual approach. The primary legal materials subjected to specific examination encompass the regulatory framework governing the agency's establishment, namely Presidential Regulation No. 83 of 2024 concerning the National Nutrition Agency, Law No. 30 of 2014 on Government Administration, and Law No. 62 of 2024 on the State Budget. The statutory approach is utilized to scrutinize the *ratio legis* and the hierarchy of norms, whereas the conceptual approach is deployed to dissect the doctrine of executive legal politics and the pathology of the merit system within public administration.

The collection of secondary legal materials was operationalized through a structured literature review. Data retrieval relied upon reputable international and national academic databases, with search parameters strictly confined to publications from the past five years (2020–2026). Inclusion criteria focused specifically on peer-reviewed scholarship, extracted using complex Boolean operator combinations with the following keywords: "food security governance" OR "administrative law", AND "merit system" OR "executive heavy". To safeguard the precision and jurisprudential validity of the analyzed data, public opinion pieces and non-academic technical reports were rigorously excluded.

Distinguishing itself from mere descriptive qualitative observation, the legal analysis in this study was operationalized through systematic and teleological statutory interpretation techniques, structured upon the Issue, Rule, Application, and Conclusion (IRAC) paradigm.¹⁷ Fundamental doctrines of constitutional law—such as the Hierarchy of Norms (*Stufenbau des Rechts*) and the Rule of Law (*Rechtsstaat*)—were not relegated to mere conceptual definitions; rather, they were functionally operationalized as analytical instruments. The *Rechtsstaat* doctrine was actively employed to confront the legality of the BGN's unilateral establishment via Presidential Regulation against the constitutional imperatives of checks and balances and parliamentary budgetary politics. Furthermore, the parameters of the General Principles of Good Administration (AUPB)—specifically the principle of professional competence—and the concept of meritocracy were directly juxtaposed with the factual realities of the BGN's leadership appointment. This argumentative triangulation aims to objectively evaluate the ethical coherence of

¹⁷ Sukiati Sukiati, Abd. Mukhsin, and Dava Al-Farizi, "Methods of Analyzing Judges' Decisions in Normative Legal Research Case-Based Approach and Islamic Law," *Journal of Education, Humaniora and Social Sciences (JEHSS)* 6, no. 3 (February 26, 2024): 1310–19, <https://doi.org/10.34007/jehss.v6i3.1972>.

public officials and generate precise legal prescriptions for comprehensive institutional restructuring.

B. DISCUSSION

1. Legal Politics Review of the BGN's Establishment via Presidential Regulation

a. Political Configuration and the Character of the Legal Product

In the post-amendment Indonesian constitutional ecosystem, the establishment of state institutions reflects a dynamic dialectic between bureaucratic technocratic necessities and the political interests of power holders. From a normative-theoretical perspective, government agencies can be established through several hierarchical pathways: explicitly based on a constitutional mandate (e.g., the Constitutional Court or the Judicial Commission), through statutory delegation (e.g., the Corruption Eradication Commission or the National Narcotics Agency), or via executive discretion in the form of a Presidential Regulation (*Peraturan Presiden*). The instantaneous realization of the National Nutrition Agency (*Badan Gizi Nasional* or BGN) through Presidential Regulation No. 83 of 2024 manifests a legal product characterized by extreme executive centralization (*executive heavy*).¹⁸ This phenomenon simultaneously prolongs the historical precedent of proliferating state auxiliary organs that frequently culminates in bureaucratic obesity, wherein new agencies are created to address specific crises or programs without restructuring the pre-existing institutional apparatus.

A legal politics analysis views the establishment of this institution via a Presidential Regulation as a clear reflection of executive pragmatism. During the governmental transition period, the President-elect faced massive political urgency to immediately realize his primary campaign promise, namely the Free Nutritious Meal Program (MBG).¹⁹ To facilitate this program, the executive designed a bureaucratic instrument that could be fully controlled in a centralized and hierarchical manner without regulatory impediments. Initiating the formation of this strategic agency through the statutory legislative process in the House of Representatives (DPR) was dismissed as an inefficient mechanism in terms of both time and political consensus. The deliberation of a Bill was presumed to invite a protracted legislative review, trigger debates regarding the epistemological basis

¹⁸ Hakim and Yuliana, "Implikasi Yuridis Perpres Nomor 83 Tahun 2024 Terhadap Tata Kelola Program Makan Bergizi Gratis."

¹⁹ Masruri and Nugraha, "Program Makan Bergizi Gratis Sebagai Instrumen Politik Janji Pemilu: Analisis Kebijakan Anggaran Dan Dampaknya Terhadap Kualitas Pendidikan Indonesia Dalam Menyongsong Indoensia Emas 2045."

of nutrition within the academic draft, and compel the executive to share power and compromise with various parliamentary factions.²⁰ Furthermore, the legislative route would have forced the government to prematurely expose the real posture of the State Budget (APBN) to the public sphere—a political risk deliberately evaded by the regime during the initial phase of the power transition.

This *executive-heavy* maneuver demonstrates that contemporary presidential regimes frequently manipulate administrative law instruments—such as decrees or presidential regulations—to execute populist programs and circumvent parliamentary resistance. By opting for the Presidential Regulation pathway, the executive effectively severed the chain of public participation and the democratic deliberative processes that must ideally accompany the creation of heavily funded state institutions. Although the President's attributive authority to issue Presidential Regulations is formally guaranteed by Article 5, paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution and its practice is expanded under Law No. 12 of 2011, the utilization of this discretion within a responsive rule-of-law paradigm reveals the dominance of developmentalist ideology over constitutional principles.^{21,22} This paradigm justifies the circumvention of substantive democratic procedures merely to achieve "developmental output." Consequently, the essence of checks and balances is reduced to a mere formal legality devoid of substantive oversight.

Ultimately, the choice to utilize a Presidential Regulation for an agency of the BGN's caliber spawns governmental governance anomalies that correlate directly with public policy outcomes. First, it engenders potential jurisdictional overlaps. The execution of public nutritional fulfillment has historically and legally been the portfolio of the Ministry of Health (Kemenkes), the National Population and Family Planning Board (BKKBN), and the Ministry of Social Affairs. The introduction of this new entity without the revocation of the existing agencies' authorities risks precipitating bureaucratic inefficiency. This precisely confirms Thomson's (2024) postulate, which proves that administrative law design operates directly as a determinant of public health; the absence of a harmonized legal structure and institutional oversight inherently degrades operational nutritional

²⁰ Wira Atma Hajri and Rahdiansyah Rahdiansyah, "Pengujian Peraturan Perundang-Undangan Di Indonesia: Persoalan Dan Jalan Keluarnya," *UIR LAW REVIEW* 2, no. 01 (April 2018): 235, <https://doi.org/10.25299/uirlrev.2018.2.01.1436>.

²¹ Hadyan Iman Prasetya, "The Law of Lawmaking as Quasi Constitutional Legislation," *Jurnal Konstitusi* 20, no. 1 (March 2023): 36–57, <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk2013>.

²² Muhammad Bagir Shadr and Ramli Santos, "Politik Hukum Pembentukan Undang-Undang: Suatu Upaya Menjaga Kualitas Legislasi Di Indonesia," *LK2 FHUI*, 2025, <https://lk2fhui.law.ui.ac.id/portfolio/politik-hukum-pembentukan-undang-undang-suatu-upaya-menjaga-kualitas-legislasi-di-indonesia/>.

safety standards.²³ Second, it creates an asymmetry in budgetary governance. An agency projected to manage trillions of rupiahs in state funds ought to possess a statutory-level legal foundation to guarantee the principle of *lex certa* (legal certainty). An institution born purely out of presidential discretion is highly susceptible to *ad hoc* dissolution by subsequent presidents, thereby destabilizing the long-term sustainability of the malnutrition eradication program.

b. The Repudiation of the Super-Body Institutional Formation Tradition

Throughout the trajectory of Indonesian state administration, institutional formation has been heavily dictated by the scale of its authority and operational impact. Agencies possessing interventionist reach across all facets of societal life, broad regulatory binding power, and the authority to manage massive state finances are customarily constructed through statutory instruments (Laws). This legislative tradition is designed not as a mere bureaucratic formality, but to ensure that a "super-body" institution maintains a robust philosophical, sociological, and juridical footing. Through the statutory formation process, the state imposes proportional operational boundaries (limitation of power), establishes rigid checks and balances clauses, and institutionalizes a multi-layered oversight system.

Establishing the BGN solely through Presidential Regulation No. 83 of 2024 constitutes a glaring disruption of this constitutional tradition. The BGN was not designed merely to execute regular administrative duties or to act as a temporary task force. On the contrary, this agency is vested with a permanent and hegemonic mandate to formulate policies, execute, and coordinate nutritional fulfillment for tens of millions of beneficiaries nationally.²⁴ Fiscally, this entity is entrusted with a highly determinant portion of the APBN structure.²⁵ Even though its existence is formally recognized under constitutional law, establishing an agency of this caliber purely through unilateral executive initiative generates an inherent institutional weakness. An asymmetry emerges between the magnitude of the managed budget and its degree of democratic accountability, thereby precipitating a legitimacy deficit.

²³ Thomson, "Administrative Law as a Determinant of Public Health."

²⁴ Hilda Aulia et al., "Polemik Alokasi Dana MBG Dalam APBN 2026: Tinjauan Konstitusionalitas Anggaran Pendidikan 20%," *Jurnal Moralita : Jurnal Pendidikan Pancasila Dan Kewarganegaraan* 7, no. 1 (2026): 62–70, <https://doi.org/10.36985/zr1aeh92>.

²⁵ Anisa Indraini, "Bahas Anggaran 2025, Bos Badan Gizi Nasional Ikut Raapat Di DPR," *detikfinance*, 2024, <https://finance.detik.com/berita-ekonomi-bisnis/d-7533914/bahas-anggaran-2025-bos-badan-gizi-nasional-ikut-rapat-di-dpr>.

Comparatively, global literature demonstrates that successful mass nutritional interventions absolutely rely on statutory power, not administrative discretion. The study by Alves Da Silva et al. (2023) on the National School Feeding Program (PNAE) in Brazil empirically refutes the effectiveness of the centralized model via Presidential Regulation implemented in Indonesia. The resilience of mass nutritional interventions in Brazil has proven to be highly dependent on rigid federal statutory delegation to lock in decentralized oversight, rendering the program immune to the political fluctuations of executive regimes.²⁶ Empirical studies within legal politics literature reveal that ministry-level agencies formed purely through Presidential Regulations are highly vulnerable to the phenomenon of fragile institutionalism.²⁷ As a comparative precedent in Indonesia, in 2020, the President unilaterally liquidated ten state agencies—including the Food Security Council, which also managed the vital livelihoods of the populace—through Presidential Regulation No. 112 of 2020 under the guise of bureaucratic downsizing. This historical fact affirms that the strategy of architecting the BGN upon a Presidential Regulation legal basis constitutes a form of constitutional governance myopia. The state rationally traded a persistent legal foundation for the convenience of short-term operational control, which ultimately compromises the stability of the institutional architecture in the future.

c. The Parliamentary Power of the Purse as an Instrument of *De Facto* Legitimacy

Confronted with the BGN's acute *de jure* foundational vulnerability from the perspective of legislative hierarchy, an essential constitutional dialectic arises: how can an agency lacking a statutory basis survive and execute a colossal-scale program? The resolution to this anomaly lies within the dynamics of power relations manifested in budgetary politics. It is at this juncture that a structural paradox occurs. The House of Representatives (DPR), whose legislative formation function was bypassed by the President in establishing the BGN, paradoxically confers full constitutional legitimacy through its other instrument of power: the Power of the Purse (*Hak Budget*).²⁸

²⁶ Alves Da Silva, Pedrozo, and Nunes Da Silva, "The PNAE (National School Feeding Program) Activity System and Its Mediations."

²⁷ Hakim and Yuliana, "Implikasi Yuridis Perpres Nomor 83 Tahun 2024 Terhadap Tata Kelola Program Makan Bergizi Gratis."

²⁸ Satria Budi Kusuma et al., "Hubungan Fungsional Antara Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) Dan Presiden Dalam Bidang Pengawasan Di Indonesia Menurut UUD 1945," *Jurnal Diskresi* 3, no. 1 (June 2024), <https://doi.org/10.29303/diskresi.v3i1.5085>.

This mechanism of institutional stabilization for the BGN was tangibly visualized during the deliberation process of the 2025 Draft State Budget (RAPBN). The Budget Committee (Banggar) alongside Commission IX of the DPR ratified and approved an operational fund allocation of IDR 71 trillion explicitly earmarked for the BGN's operations.²⁹ This act of approval constructs a phenomenon of manufacturing "*de facto* legitimacy." Although materially the parliament never conducted a public feasibility assessment (*fit and proper test*) regarding the urgency, jurisdictional overlap, or the propriety of the BGN's institutional design through a Bill instrument, the gavel strike validating the APBN provided factual recognition and absolute financial authorization.³⁰ Considering that the APBN is enacted through a statutory framework (Law No. 62 of 2024), this budgetary approval operates as a mechanism of backdoor legitimacy, engineering the degree of recognition for the presidentially formed agency to equate to that of a statutorily established entity.

This dynamic reflects high-level political transactions institutionalized within a multiparty presidential system, wherein parliaments in democratically transitioning states tend to marginalize their corrective functions to secure logistical access. DPR factions opted to downplay the legal-formal architectural weaknesses of the BGN to accommodate the populist wave of the MBG program. Rejecting the budgetary allocation for such a populist-nuanced program is calculated as an electoral vulnerability among parliamentarians' constituencies. As a substitute, the APBN approval forum was converted into a bargaining arena. Parliament acquired a pragmatic space to distribute political influence, secure procurement supply chains, or ensure program logistics are distributed to their respective electoral districts—a practice inherently synonymous with pork-barrel politics.³¹

The political consensus channeled into the APBN Law document practically cures the presidentialist defects present during the initial phase of the BGN's formation. Substantively, however, this mechanism sets a precedent that degrades democratic institutionalization. This phenomenon evinces the fragility of the legislative branch's constitutional checks function when confronted with a narrative of structural populism.

²⁹ Firda Janati and Jessi Carina, "DPR Setujui Anggaran Program Makan Bergizi Gratis Rp 71 Triliun Masuk APBN 2025," Kompas, 2025, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/01/06/15111781/dpr-setujui-anggaran-program-makan-bergizi-gratis-rp-71-triliun-masuk-apbn>.

³⁰ Mei Susanto, *Hak Budget Parlemen Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2015). Page, 55.

³¹ Susanto. Page, 55.

Rather than enforcing proportional constitutional governance principles and demanding the formation of a strict statutory basis (*lex stricta*), the legislative branch was instead co-opted into a pragmatic compromise that ultimately perpetuates the dominance of an *executive-heavy* constitutional architecture.³²

2. Implications for Governance, Governmental Ethics, and Professionalism

a. The Violation of the Principle of Professionalism and Governmental Ethics

In the doctrine of modern public governance, the successful execution of policies intervening in fundamental citizens' rights heavily relies upon the technocratic capabilities of the apex leadership within the relevant authority. For an agency managing budgets amounting to tens of trillions of rupiah, public administrative law imperatively mandates the application of the merit system. This system requires that appointments to high-ranking leadership positions be absolutely predicated upon linear competence, academic qualifications, and a professional track record insulated from political patronage.³³ However, within the governance architecture of the National Nutrition Agency (BGN), this meritocratic principle has suffered a fundamental degradation. The appointment of Prof. Dr. Ir. Dadan Hindayana—an applied entomologist specializing in agricultural pests and insects—as the Head of the BGN precipitates extreme epistemological dissonance, considering the agency's primary mandate encompasses the resolution of clinical malnutrition crises, the improvement of maternal nutrition, and public health epidemiology.³⁴

Within global academic discourse, this structural anomaly empirically validates the recent studies by Ferede et al. (2025) and Mirayanti et al. (2025). Both scholarly works conclusively demonstrate that the illusion of meritocracy—specifically the appointment of figures lacking technical expertise to senior leadership roles via political affirmation— inherently disrupts accountability and culminates in policy failures within public service delivery.^{35,36} The empirical reality at the BGN corroborates this thesis: the state institution's functionality is reduced to an instrument of office commodification (a *spoils*

³² Badan Pengkajian Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, *Checks And Balances Dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia* (Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian MPR RI, 2017). Page, 70.

³³ 'Amah and Aminullah, "Meritokrasi Dalam Bayang-Bayang Birokrasi."

³⁴ Albert Gustian, "Profil Kepala BGN: Siapa Dadan Hindayana? Ini Biodata Dan Perjalanan Kariernya," Gen Amikom, 2026, <https://blog.amikom.ac.id/profil-kepala-bgn/>.

³⁵ Ferede, Endawoke, and Tessema, "Assessment of Meritocracy, Accountability, and Public Service Reforms in Ethiopia: Evidence from Public Organizations in the Northwest Region."

³⁶ Mirayanti et al., "The Illusion of Meritocracy: A Critical Analysis of Open Selection for Senior Leadership in Indonesia."

system) designed to accommodate executive affiliates. This appointment, which deviates from scientific rationality, does not merely dismantle bureaucratic standards; it places the probability of success for the Free Nutritious Meal Program (MBG) at severe risk of technocratic failure. Governance built upon the foundation of cronyism ultimately forfeits its justification for generating evidence-based policy formulations.

From the perspective of administrative law, the appointment of a non-expert leader to the BGN diametrically conflicts with the imperative norms of Article 10 of Law No. 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration. This statute mandates that every governmental action must adhere to the General Principles of Good Administration (AUPB).³⁷ The authentic interpretation of the Law explicitly defines the "Principle of Professionalism" as actions prioritizing expertise grounded in professional codes of ethics.³⁸ Consequently, technical expertise constitutes an absolute prerequisite (*conditio sine qua non*). The exercise of the President's prerogative discretion to delegate the formulation of human biological nutrition interventions to an agricultural plant protection expert represents a fundamental violation of the substantive expertise envisioned by the AUPB. Authoritative power thereby fails to establish a linear correlation with epistemic competence.

The disruption resulting from the absence of clinical nutritional expertise at the apex of leadership precisely yielded policy failures during the BGN's initial operationalization. The absence of a biomedical foundation reduces the multidimensional complexity of the stunting epidemic (which encompasses the social determinants of health and maternal sanitation) into a mere matter of mass logistical management. The most conspicuous manifestation of this dissonance is the official discourse advanced by the Head of the BGN proposing the use of insects (grasshoppers and sago worms) as mass protein substitutes for toddlers.³⁹ This unscientific discourse demonstrates how agricultural pest science biases are applied reductionistically to the human medical domain without adequate allergen risk mitigation. This failure in quality assurance was

³⁷ Irlandi Paradizsa and Budi Susanto, "The Implementation of Law Number 30 of 2014 on Government Administration: Support, Critics, and Application of the Law," *Progress In Social Development* 4, no. 2 (June 2023): 61–72, <https://doi.org/10.30872/psd.v4i2.73>.

³⁸ Bagoes Soenarjanto, "Penerapan Asas-Asas Umum Pemerintahan Yang Baik Dalam Perumusan Kebijakan Publik," *Jurnal Widya Publika* 7, no. 1 (June 2019): 1–12, <https://doi.org/10.47329/widyapublika.v7i1.626>.

³⁹ Rico Afrido Simanjuntak, "Usulkan Serangga Sebagai Menu Program Makan Bergizi Gratis, Dadan Hindayana Tuai Kritik," *Sindo News*, 2025, <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1521709/15/usulkan-serangga-sebagai-menu-program-makan-bergizi-gratis-dadan-hindayana-tuai-kritikan-1737939715>.

subsequently confirmed by a series of mass food poisoning incidents (*foodborne intoxication*) afflicting MBG student beneficiaries during the early phases.⁴⁰ These incidents serve as concrete evidentiary proof of the state's failure to institutionalize public food safety standards due to the dereliction of meritocracy.

b. The Risk of Jurisdictional Overlap (Disharmony)

Beyond degrading meritocratic parameters, the regulatory architecture of Presidential Regulation No. 83 of 2024 engineers a state of disharmony and overlapping jurisdiction with ministries possessing hierarchically superior statutory foundations. To map this jurisdictional collision, observe the following technical comparison:

Table 1. Potential Administrative Law Collisions Among State Agencies

Government Agency	Legal Basis of Existence (Mandate)	Intersecting Existing Technical Authorities	Potential Administrative Law Collision
National Nutrition Agency (BGN)	Presidential Regulation No. 83 of 2024	Execution of national nutritional fulfillment, alleviation of nutritional insecurity, and targeted interventions.	Cross-sectoral operational execution lacking statutory sectoral mandate constraints.
National Food Agency (Bapanas)	Law No. 18 of 2012 <i>in conjunction with</i> Presidential Regulation No. 66 of 2021	Determination of strategic food availability, supervision of nutritional quality, and oversight of fresh food safety in circulation.	Jurisdictional conflict in the oversight of logistical supply chain safety from upstream sources to processing within BGN kitchens.
Ministry of Health (Kemenkes)	Law No. 17 of 2023 on Health	Establishment of clinical nutritional standards, surveillance of nutritional diseases/stunting, and management of Extraordinary Events (KLB) related to food poisoning.	Tug-of-war over medical authority should the MBG inflict fatal impacts on children's mass health.

This overlap analysis fundamentally supports and extends Thomson's (2024) findings regarding administrative law as a determinant of public health. Thomson proved that the absence of a coherent constitutional legal structure among institutions directly diminishes operational standards of nutritional safety.⁴¹ Although the executive rhetorically claims an absence of sectoral overlap,⁴² the juridical reality demonstrates that Bapanas's imperative authority to safeguard the quality of national food circulation has

⁴⁰ Farhan and Phahlevy, "Government Responsibility and Liability in the Implementation of the Free Nutritious Food Program."

⁴¹ Thomson, "Administrative Law as a Determinant of Public Health."

⁴² Lailatul Anisah, "Ada Badan Gizi Nasional, Bapanas Tegaskan Tak Ada Tugas Yang Tumpang Tindih," Kontan, 2024, <https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/ada-badan-gizi-nasional-bapanas-tegaskan-tak-ada-tugas-yang-tumpang-tindih>.

been firmly secured by Law No. 18 of 2012. When the BGN monopolizes the mass production chain via Nutritional Fulfillment Service Units (SPPG), Bapanas's quality control mechanisms are factually bypassed. Even more crucially, during medical emergencies resulting from food contamination, the Health Law mandates the Kemenkes to intervene, while the causal entity (the BGN) operates under its own internal operational procedures. This disharmony breeds ambiguity in liability instruments within administrative law, obfuscating the attribution of accountability for unlawful acts committed by the government (*onrechtmatige overheidsdaad*) regarding the negligence of public consumption standards.

c. The Void in Accountability Design

The epistemological vulnerabilities and the lack of linear qualifications within the BGN's leadership could theoretically be mitigated if the institutional posture were fortified with strict mechanisms of checks and balances. However, a normative scrutiny of Presidential Regulation No. 83 of 2024 instead confirms a monolithic governance design. The BGN's organizational structure is purely dominated by technical executing functionaries. This legal instrument fails to institutionalize independent external oversight mechanisms; the absence of an "Independent Supervisory Board" or a "Medical Expert Committee" vested with technical veto rights reflects a legislative pathology.

Rather than adopting peer-expertise-based controls, the BGN's oversight function is reduced to mere vertical internal supervision through the Main Inspectorate. Pursuant to National Nutrition Agency Regulation No. 2 of 2025, this supervisory element is structurally placed under the absolute subordination of the Head of the BGN. This construction generates a classic conflict of interest paradox, wherein the supervisory instrument's independence is amputated. Operationalizing discretionary authority worth trillions of rupiah targeting the physiological well-being of millions of individuals, under the command of non-expert leadership devoid of independent expert supervision, constitutes a form of systemic maladministration. This void in scientifically based quality assurance legitimizes unchecked discretionary power, which bears direct implications for the inefficient allocation of the APBN, the vulnerability of logistical procurement, and threatens the future resilience of the national malnutrition eradication program.

3. Comparative Analysis of Legality, Mandates, and Expertise Requirements: An International Perspective

a. A Comparative Assessment of Legal Foundations and Institutional Mandates (Case Studies: India and Brazil)

In modern constitutional and public administrative law doctrine, the resilience, accountability, and legitimacy of a national-scale agency or program are fundamentally dictated by the foundational hierarchy of statutory regulations (*Stufenbau des Rechts*). State interventions that manage the vital livelihoods of the populace and absorb massive budgetary allocations should ideally emanate from the space of democratic deliberation within parliament to ensure the accommodation of checks and balances. In stark contrast to the legal architecture of the National Nutrition Agency (BGN)—which was born purely out of unilateral executive discretion (*executive-heavy*) via a Presidential Regulation instrument devoid of any parent statutory umbrella or legislative delegation—state interventions for nutritional fulfillment in other developing nations are constructed through rigid legislative processes. A comparative law approach examining India and Brazil demonstrates how a robust legal design is capable of transforming a nutritional program from a vulnerable populist instrument into a persistent realization of constitutional rights.

Within the Indian constitutional context (Mid-Day Meal Scheme / PM POSHAN), the nutritional fulfillment intervention originated as sectoral initiatives at the state level, which subsequently evolved into a colossal national mandate through judicial activism. In 2001, the Supreme Court of India, in its landmark ruling (*People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India*), executed a progressive legal discovery by interpreting the right to food as an absolute derivative of the fundamental right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.⁴³ This *ratio decidendi* revolutionized the nutritional paradigm, shifting it from mere "state charity" to an absolute "constitutional obligation." To execute this judicial mandate, rather than responding by unilaterally establishing a super-body agency via an executive decree, the Indian parliament institutionalized this program through the highest statutory instrument: the National Food Security Act (NFSA) of 2013. This statute elevates the child nutritional fulfillment program into a justiciable right,

⁴³ International Law Reports, "People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India and Another," *International Law Reports* 125 (January 1, 2004): 510–19, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CB09781316152577.011>.

conferring legal standing upon citizens to sue the government should their daily nutritional standards remain unmet.

Diametrically opposed to the absence of a legislative delegation foundation in the BGN, the legal framework in India confirms the study by Thankachan et al. (2026) regarding the critical role of statutory standardization in securing nutritional quality.⁴⁴ The NFSA explicitly mandates three rigid instruments: (1) legally binding provisions on the minimum thresholds for caloric and protein intake per child; (2) the obligation of cost-sharing or fiscal federalism between the central and state governments to prevent budgetary monopolies and stimulate the local governments' sense of belonging; and (3) open auditing through a social audit mechanism and a grievance redressal panel at the district level, providing instruments for the public to directly and transparently supervise logistical distribution.

Comparable legislative robustness is equally represented in the governance architecture of Brazil (*Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar / PNAE*). As one of the oldest and most expansive public nutritional intervention programs globally, the PNAE's legal architecture does not rest upon the temporary discretion of a head of state; rather, it is locked absolutely through a federal statute (Lei nº 11.947/2009). This Brazilian legal approach extends the political-economic discourse on nutrition as comprehensively analyzed by Marques & Dalbianco (2025) and Alves Da Silva et al. (2023). Both studies evince that the existence of a Federal Statutory foundation insulates the PNAE from the inherent defects that plague the BGN, thereby endowing it with long-term institutional resilience immune to the risks of unilateral dissolution or budgetary reduction during transitions of executive or legislative regimes.^{45,46} The strength of this Federal Law mandates two holistic instruments. First, a circular economy mandate expressly obligating a minimum of 30% of the total federal nutritional operational funds to be allocated toward procuring food products from family farming (*agricultura familiar*). Second, the decentralization and participatory oversight achieved through the establishment of School Food Councils (*Conselho de Alimentação Escolar / CAE*) at the

⁴⁴ Prashanth Thankachan, Sumathi Swaminathan, and Sumithra Muthayya, "Food Fortification in India: Evidence, Implementation and Future Directions to Reduce Iron and Other Micronutrient Deficiencies," *European Journal of Clinical Nutrition*, 2026, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41430-026-01761-y>.

⁴⁵ Etyéle Bastos Marques and Vinicius Piccin Dalbianco, "National School Feeding Program (PNAE): A Historical-Political Analysis," *ARACÊ* 7, no. 9 (September 30, 2025): e8569, <https://doi.org/10.56238/arev7n9-324>.

⁴⁶ Alves Da Silva, Pedrozo, and Nunes Da Silva, "The PNAE (National School Feeding Program) Activity System and Its Mediations."

municipal level. The CAE is not a subordinate executive instrument, but rather an independent, cross-sectoral control organ (comprising civil society, teachers, parents, and local government) possessing the administrative judicial authority to veto financial reports and supervise nutritional quality—a *good governance* design that starkly contrasts with the BGN's monolithic internal inspectorate.

b. A Comparative Analysis of Expertise Requirements and Oversight (Case Study: Japan)

The epistemological vulnerability of the BGN in Indonesia originates not only from its *executive-heavy* institutional structure but also from the absolute absence of meritocratic parameters in the appointment of its leadership. The legislative *lacuna* within Presidential Regulation No. 83 of 2024 generated a maladministrative loophole that permitted the appointment of an entomologist (an agricultural pest expert) as the supreme policymaker for human physiological nutrition affairs. This anomaly presents a stark regulatory regression when juxtaposed against the administrative law ecosystem in Japan.

This study is comparatively validated by the empirical findings of Iwano et al. (2025), which highlights the rigorous standards of Japanese nutritional regulations through the School Lunch Act (1954). Japan's regulatory framework positions the nutritional fulfillment program as an instrument of holistic health, institutionalized through conceptual nutritional education (*Shokuiku*).⁴⁷ Legally, the operational execution of nutrition is strictly prohibited from being delegated to bureaucrats lacking a linear track record; the statute imperatively requires every school to appoint specifically certified Diet and Nutrition Teachers. This cadre of clinical nutrition experts holds the absolute legal mandate to design comprehensive, nutrition-based menus, supervise food safety standards, and manage hygiene. The disregard for expertise linearity within the BGN demonstrates a sharp dissonance with the *best practice* jurisprudence in Japan, where the executive authority over public nutrition is exclusively authorized to medical and nutritional professionals.

⁴⁷ Suzuna Iwano et al., "School Lunch and Body Size in Japanese Junior High School Students: The Japanese National Health and Nutrition Survey," *Nutrients* 17, no. 5 (March 3, 2025): 895, <https://doi.org/10.3390/nu17050895>.

c. Synthesis of International Comparisons

To encapsulate the structural anomalies of the BGN's governance within a global perspective, the following comparative table synthesizes the constitutional anatomical parameters among Indonesia, India, Brazil, and Japan:

Table 2. Comparative Juridical Analysis of International National Nutrition Institutions

Juridical Analysis Indicator	BGN (Indonesia)	PM POSHAN / MDMS (India)	PNAE (Brazil)	School Lunch Act (Japan)
Form of Establishment Regulation	Presidential Regulation (Perpres No. 83/2024)	Statute / Act of Parliament (National Food Security Act 2013)	Federal Statute (Lei nº 11.947/2009)	Statute / Act of Parliament (School Lunch Act 1954)
Philosophical Foundation of the Right	Administrative initiative / Transitional political promise	Constitutional mandate via Supreme Court ruling	National Food Security and grassroots economy	Nutritional character education (<i>Shokuiku</i>) and holistic health
Application of the Merit System & Expertise Requirements	Unregulated (Engendered discretionary appointment of an insect/entomology expert)	Managed by a transparent cross-sectoral bureaucratic structure	Cross-expert School Food Councils (CAE) at the municipal level	Rigid/absolute statutory requirement for the presence of Diet & Nutrition Teachers in schools
Accountability Design & Checks and Balances	Monolithic centralization; absence of independent medical/nutritional committees	Decentralization of supervisory committees from state to village levels	Independently supervised by civil society and local councils (CAE)	Integrated nutritional standard compliance audits by educational and health agencies

This comparative synthesis articulates a definitive administrative law postulate: the utilization of *executive-heavy* discretion in establishing a mass budget-managing agency on par with the BGN constitutes an obsolete precedent lagging far behind modern constitutional practices. Nations undertaking interventions of a similar magnitude have revolutionized their public nutritional governance by prioritizing the legal certainty of statutory instruments, institutionalizing decentralized oversight, and enforcing a merit system strictly beholden to pure scientific expertise.

C. CONCLUSION

The establishment of the National Nutrition Agency (BGN) via the singular instrument of a Presidential Regulation, devoid of statutory delegation, constitutes a glaring manifestation of executive aggrandizement that subverts the constitutional limitation of power; paradoxically, the legislature was co-opted into conferring *de facto*

legitimacy by authorizing multi-trillion-rupiah budgetary allocations to accommodate populist programming. From the perspective of administrative governance, the BGN's monolithic institutional architecture engenders jurisdictional disharmony with pre-existing ministerial authorities and spawns a severe accountability vacuum stemming from the absence of an independent external supervisory committee. Furthermore, the abrogation of the principle of professionalism—evidenced by the appointment of an apex leader devoid of clinical nutritional expertise (an entomologist)—represents a fundamental violation of the merit system that has empirically precipitated policy dissonance and inflicted fatal vulnerabilities upon public health safety standards. Consequently, restoring the governance of national nutritional interventions imperatively necessitates the comprehensive restructuring of the BGN into a statutorily grounded entity that institutionalizes decentralized oversight and mandates the operationalization of evidence-based policies under the exclusive purview of medical health experts.

REFERENCES

- 'Amah, Tatimmatunni, and Aminullah Aminullah. "Meritokrasi Dalam Bayang-Bayang Birokrasi." *Parleментар: Jurnal Studi Hukum Dan Administrasi Publik* 3, no. 1 (February 13, 2026): 01–07. <https://doi.org/10.62383/parleментар.v3i1.1496>.
- Alves Da Silva, Eliane, Eugenio Avila Pedrozo, and Tania Nunes Da Silva. "The PNAE (National School Feeding Program) Activity System and Its Mediations." *Frontiers in Environmental Science* 10 (January 6, 2023). <https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2022.981932>.
- Anisah, Lailatul. "Ada Badan Gizi Nasional, Bapanas Tegaskan Tak Ada Tugas Yang Tumpang Tindih." Kontan, 2024. <https://nasional.kontan.co.id/news/ada-badan-gizi-nasional-bapanas-tegaskan-tak-ada-tugas-yang-tumpang-tindih>.
- Ardini, Iqra, Christa Dewi Ametha Sembiring, Dinda Shafira, Inas Ulfa Hapsari, and Novia Anggi Ratnasari. "Strategi Komunikasi Badan Gizi Nasional Dalam Pelibatan Pemangku Kepentingan: Studi Pada Kasus Keracunan Makanan Program Makan Bergizi Gratis." *Jurnal Manajemen Pendidikan Dan Ilmu Sosial* 7, no. 2 (March 2026): 1670–82. <https://doi.org/10.38035/jmpis.v7i2.7927>.
- Aulia, Hilda, Kayla Chairunnisa, Putri Nurkhalifah, and Zaenul Slam. "Polemik Alokasi Dana MBG Dalam APBN 2026: Tinjauan Konstitusionalitas Anggaran Pendidikan 20%." *Jurnal Moralita : Jurnal Pendidikan Pancasila Dan Kewarganegaraan* 7, no. 1 (2026): 62–70. <https://doi.org/10.36985/zr1aeh92>.
- Badan Pengkajian Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia. *Checks And Balances Dalam Sistem Ketatanegaraan Indonesia*. Jakarta: Badan Pengkajian MPR RI, 2017.
- Farhan, Mohammad, and Rifqi Ridlo Phahlevy. "Government Responsibility and Liability in the Implementation of the Free Nutritious Food Program," 2026.

<https://doi.org/10.21070/ups.10365>.

- Ferede, Worku Lemlemu, Yalew Endawoke, and Gedif Tessema. "Assessment of Meritocracy, Accountability, and Public Service Reforms in Ethiopia: Evidence from Public Organizations in the Northwest Region." *Cogent Business & Management* 12, no. 1 (December 12, 2025). <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2025.2492388>.
- Gustian, Albert. "Profil Kepala BGN: Siapa Dadan Hindayana? Ini Biodata Dan Perjalanan Kariernya." *Gen Amikom*, 2026. <https://blog.amikom.ac.id/profil-kepala-bgn/>.
- Hajri, Wira Atma, and Rahdiansyah Rahdiansyah. "Pengujian Peraturan Perundang-Undangan Di Indonesia: Persoalan Dan Jalan Keluarnya." *UIR LAW REVIEW* 2, no. 01 (April 2018): 235. <https://doi.org/10.25299/uirlrev.2018.2.01.1436>.
- Hakim, Bawon Nul, and Wahida Yuliana. "Implikasi Yuridis Perpres Nomor 83 Tahun 2024 Terhadap Tata Kelola Program Makan Bergizi Gratis." *Ekspose: Jurnal Penelitian Hukum Dan Pendidikan* 24, no. 2 (October 2025): 267–83. <https://doi.org/10.30863/ekspose.v24i2.10485>.
- Hutchinson, Terry. "Doctrinal Research." In *Research Methods in Law*, 8–38. London: Routledge, 2025. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781032710372-2>.
- Indraini, Anisa. "Bahas Anggaran 2025, Bos Badan Gizi Nasional Ikut Raapat Di DPR." *detikfinance*, 2024. <https://finance.detik.com/berita-ekonomi-bisnis/d-7533914/bahas-anggaran-2025-bos-badan-gizi-nasional-ikut-rapat-di-dpr>.
- International Law Reports. "People's Union for Civil Liberties v . Union of India and Another." *International Law Reports* 125 (January 1, 2004): 510–19. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316152577.011>.
- Iwano, Suzuna, Kotone Tanaka, Aru Takaoka, Daisuke Machida, and Yasutake Tomata. "School Lunch and Body Size in Japanese Junior High School Students: The Japanese National Health and Nutrition Survey." *Nutrients* 17, no. 5 (March 3, 2025): 895. <https://doi.org/10.3390/nu17050895>.
- Janati, Firda, and Jessi Carina. "DPR Setujui Anggaran Program Makan Bergizi Gratis Rp 71 Triliun Masuk APBN 2025." *Kompas*, 2025. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2025/01/06/15111781/dpr-setujui-anggaran-program-makan-bergizi-gratis-rp-71-triliun-masuk-apbn>.
- Kusuma, Satria Budi, Haeruman Jayadi, AD. Basniwati, and Muh. Alfian Fallahiyani. "Hubungan Fungsional Antara Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) Dan Presiden Dalam Bidang Pengawasan Di Indonesia Menurut UUD 1945." *Jurnal Diskresi* 3, no. 1 (June 2024). <https://doi.org/10.29303/diskresi.v3i1.5085>.
- Lendra, I Wayan, Daud Husni, and Yuyun Fitriani. "Kebijakan Makan Bergizi Gratis Dan Relevansinya Terhadap Nilai-Nilai Good Governance: Analisis Kualitatif Dalam Administrasi Publik." *Arus Jurnal Sosial Dan Humaniora* 5, no. 1 (April 2025): 937–45. <https://doi.org/10.57250/ajsh.v5i1.1252>.
- Marques, Etyéle Bastos, and Vinicius Piccin Dalbianco. "National School Feeding Program (PNAE): A Historical-Political Analysis." *ARACÊ* 7, no. 9 (September 30, 2025): e8569. <https://doi.org/10.56238/arev7n9-324>.
- Masruri, Ginanjar, and Heru Nugraha. "Program Makan Bergizi Gratis Sebagai Instrumen

- Politik Janji Pemilu: Analisis Kebijakan Anggaran Dan Dampaknya Terhadap Kualitas Pendidikan Indonesia Dalam Menyongsong Indonesia Emas 2045." *RIGGS: Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Business* 4, no. 4 (January 2026): 12100–108. <https://doi.org/10.31004/riggs.v4i4.5441>.
- Mirayanti, Mirayanti, Masdar Mas'ud, Bahar Sinring, Ramlawati Ramlawati, Abd. Kahar, and Fiansi Fiansi. "The Illusion of Meritocracy: A Critical Analysis of Open Selection for Senior Leadership in Indonesia." *Cogent Social Sciences* 11, no. 1 (December 31, 2025). <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2025.2484472>.
- Nasir, Syifa Qolbiyah. "Potential of Edible Insects in Indonesia as Nutritious Local Food." *Journal of Food and Culinary*, July 2025, 22–37. <https://doi.org/10.12928/jfc.v8i1.13717>.
- Paradizsa, Irlandi, and Budi Susanto. "The Implementation of Law Number 30 of 2014 on Government Administration: Support, Critics, and Application of the Law." *Progress In Social Development* 4, no. 2 (June 2023): 61–72. <https://doi.org/10.30872/psd.v4i2.73>.
- Pardamean, Martin Yogi. "Sejumlah Kontroversi Pernyataan Kepala BGN." *Tempo*, 2025. <https://www.tempo.co/politik/sejumlah-kontroversi-pernyataan-kepala-bgn-1593448>.
- Pora, Sahrul, Dafrin Muksin, and Al Fauzi Rahmat. "Implementasi Program Makan Bergizi Gratis Pada Pemerintahan Prabowo-Gibran: Solusi Dan Tantangan." *Jurnal Noken: Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial* 11, no. 2 (December 2025): 635–94. <https://doi.org/10.33506/jn.v11i2.4352>.
- Prasetya, Hadyan Iman. "The Law of Lawmaking as Quasi Constitutional Legislation." *Jurnal Konstitusi* 20, no. 1 (March 2023): 36–57. <https://doi.org/10.31078/jk2013>.
- Rahayu, Luis Fiska. "Dinamika Dukungan Politik Terhadap Program Makan Bergizi Gratis (MBG) Di Indonesia." *PANDITA: Interdisciplinary Journal of Public Affairs* 8, no. 2 (October 2025): 815–31. <https://doi.org/10.61332/ijpa.v8i2.381>.
- Sanitri, Dian, Annisa Finda Solihah, and Elyasa Yahya Saputri. "Kewenangan Dan Tanggung Jawab Hakim Dalam Menerapkan Asas-Asas Umum Pemerintahan Yang Baik (AAUPB): Analisis Putusan Nomor 52/G/2025/PTUN.SMG." *Journal of Innovative and Creativity* 6, no. 1 SE-Articles (January 2026): 6484–89.
- Shadr, Muhammad Bagir, and Ramli Santoso. "Politik Hukum Pembentukan Undang-Undang: Suatu Upaya Menjaga Kualitas Legislasi Di Indonesia." *LK2 FHUI*, 2025. <https://lk2fhui.law.ui.ac.id/portfolio/politik-hukum-pembentukan-undang-undang-suatu-upaya-menjaga-kualitas-legislasi-di-indonesia/>.
- Simanjuntak, Rico Afrido. "Usulkan Serangga Sebagai Menu Program Makan Bergizi Gratis, Dadan Hindayana Tuai Kritik." *Sindo News*, 2025. <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1521709/15/usulkan-serangga-sebagai-menu-program-makan-bergizi-gratis-dadan-hindayana-tuai-kritik-1737939715>.
- Soenarjanto, Bagoes. "Penerapan Asas-Asas Umum Pemerintahan Yang Baik Dalam Perumusan Kebijakan Publik." *Jurnal Widya Publika* 7, no. 1 (June 2019): 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.47329/widyapublika.v7i1.626>.

Sukiati, Sukiati, Abd. Mukhsin, and Dava Al-Farizi. "Methods of Analyzing Judges' Decisions in Normative Legal Research Case-Based Approach and Islamic Law." *Journal of Education, Humaniora and Social Sciences (JEHSS)* 6, no. 3 (February 26, 2024): 1310–19. <https://doi.org/10.34007/jehss.v6i3.1972>.

Susanto, Mei. *Hak Budget Parlemen Di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 2015.

Thankachan, Prashanth, Sumathi Swaminathan, and Sumithra Muthayya. "Food Fortification in India: Evidence, Implementation and Future Directions to Reduce Iron and Other Micronutrient Deficiencies." *European Journal of Clinical Nutrition*, 2026. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41430-026-01761-y>.

Thomson, Stephen. "Administrative Law as a Determinant of Public Health." *Canadian Journal of Public Health* 115, no. 1 (February 6, 2024): 168–72. <https://doi.org/10.17269/s41997-023-00826-w>.